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ARTICLES
JUDICIAL ETHICS IN A DIGITAL AGE
LORNE SOSSIN t & MEREDITH BACALD
One thing seems to me to be clear. In facing the reality of the modern
communications revolution, it is crucial that we understand the
technology and how it is being used-something lawyers and judges,
often castigated as Luddites, may not find easy. And having understood
the new technology and its uses, we must do what we are doing today-
discuss, reflect, and share experiences and best practices.
ChiefJustice Beverley McLachlin'
I. INTRODUCTION
Is there anything distinct about the judicial engagement with social media
that would constitute an ethical concern? If judges engage in improper
communication, for example, we tend to focus on the substance of the
communication, not whether it was in person, in print, over the phone, or
through some other medium. With social media,2 however, we confront
t Dean and Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. We are grateful to
some colleagues who read and commented on an earlier draft, including Adam Dodek
andJustice Katherine Feldman of the Ontario Court ofAppeal.
OsgoodeJD, 2014.
"The Relationship Between the Courts and the Media" (Speech delivered at Carleton
University on 31 January 2012), online: <http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/court-
cour/judges-juges/spe-dis/bm-2012-01-3 1-eng.aspx>.
2 Social media is discussed further below. For the purposes of this paper, in short, social
media will refer to social-networking websites such as Facebook, Twitter,
and MySpace.
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the question of whether the medium in some real sense may become the
message as well.3 In other words, in this context, there are really two
issues-one is a question of engagement itself (e.g., should a judge have a
Facebook page or a blog?) while the second question is one of substance
(e.g., what kinds of tweets are acceptable or unacceptable for members of a
court to post?). This brief study is devoted to addressing the question of
whether social media represents a field of judicial ethics in Canada or
simply a new venue for existing ethical guidelines to be applied. Further, if
there are new and distinct ethical quandaries to which social media gives
rise, we explore how those issues should be resolved, building on the
existing ethical templates both in and out of the courtroom.
Ethical guidelines in the context of Canadian judicial conduct are
advisory in nature, and designed so that they may be adapted to various
scenarios. Unlike fixed and precise rules, the guidelines are meant to be
both enduring and evolving. The guidelines ought to be adaptable to
developments in law, culture, and technology. That said, it is equally true
that guidelines may become outmoded (indeed, the Canadian Judicial
Council announced a review ofthe-Guidelinesin 2011)4 For example,
rules provide judges with the tools to control the flow of information in
the courtroom-to close a hearing or issue a publication ban, etc. Those
rules cease to have meaning in an era when "citizen journalists" may
publish information on trials in their blog, or live tweet a motion, or use
their cell phones to record the events transpiring in the courtroom.
"Crowdsourcing" justice has the potential to make the judge just a
participant in a connective community, rather than the person in control
of a legal process. Technology, in this sense, has disruptive potential in the
justice system (just as it does in every other system).
The phrase "the medium is the message" was first coined by Marshall McLuhan in
1964. See Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions ofMan (New
York: Mentor, 1964).
4 Cristin Schmitz, "Ethics, judges, and mediation", The Lawyers Weekly 31:16 (2
September 2011), online: <http://www.lawyersweekly.ca/
index.php?section=article&articleid= 1487>.
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The rise of social media will provide an unprecedented level of access
by the public into the lives of judges, and by judges into the lives of
everyone else. Ethical implications of social media include not simply
whether judges choose to engage with various new media for connectivity,
but also how they respond when they become the subject of interest and
scrutiny in those media. The recent tabloid judicial investigation into the
conduct of Justice Lori Douglas represents, in this sense, a particular kind
of canary in a particular kind of coal mine. Soon, it will be hard to imagine
a judicial appointee who does not bring significant social-media baggage
of one kind or another. We believe the rise of social media represents one
of those occasions where the existing guidelines are insufficient to adapt to
the disruptive potential of new technology.
This analysis has two parts. In the first part, we explore the current
ethical guidelines for federally appointed judges in Canada and how these
may be adapted to the realities of social-media connectivity. We also
highlight what we believe to be the gaps in the current ethical framework.
This analysis is complemented by selected comparative insights from peer
jurisdictions that face similar challenges. In the second section, we suggest
some forward-oriented considerations for reform and further
development both of judicial ethics and judicial discretion in the context
of social media.
II. JUDICIAL ETHICS IN CANADA
Before delving into the provisions in the Canadian Judicial Council's
(CJC) Ethical Principles for Judges,6 it is important to reiterate that these
guidelines are advisory in nature and not binding per se. In fact, as is
stated at the outset in Ethical Principles, "[tihey are not and shall not be
used as a code or a list of prohibited behaviours." As for the guiding
principles that may be used to assist judges, judges may look to broad
5 While our focus is on federally appointed judges and the ethical principles governed
by the Canadian Judicial Council, similar principles apply to the various provincially
appointed judiciaries throughout Canada.
6 (Ottawa: CJC, 2004) [Ethical Principles].
7 Ibid at 3.
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principles such as impartiality, which is assessed on the standard of a
reasonable apprehension of bias. That said, the Ethical Principles form the
basis for investigations and inquiries under the Judges Act, which can
result in the CJC recommending the removal of a judge.
With this principle in mind, judges face countervailing guidance from
the Ethical Principles: while "[j]udges should organize their personal and
business affairs to minimize the potential for conflict with their judicial
duties",o they also "[administer] the law on behalf of the community and
therefore unnecessary isolation from the community does not promote
wise or just judgments.""
In order to achieve the first principle, that of impartiality, having no
presence at all on social media might at first glance appear well-justified.
However, avoiding a medium so integral to social life in the 21st century
might constitute "unnecessary isolation" from the community and violate
another vital principle. Would we be better off if judges had not adapted
to the telephone or did not use email?
The CJC's specific response to social media has been very limited. On
the CJC's website, there are papers on Skype? Facebook and Social
Networking Security,13 and other "technology issues" These articles,
however, "do not represent any official position or views of the Canadian
Judicial Council."' The articles posted do little beyond defining and
explaining'these tools. Beyond basic explanation and a warning cautioning
use, they provide little guidance as to what the CJC considers to be
8 RSC1985,cJ-1.
9 See Philip Bryden & Lorne Sossin, "Judges" in Adam M Dodek & Jeffrey G Hoskins,
eds, Canadian Legal Practice:A Guidefor the21st Century, loose-leaf (Markham, Ont:
LexisNexis, 2009) ch 16 at 89-9 1.
10 Supra note 6 at 44.
Ibid at 34.
12 Martin Felsky, "Is Skype Safe for Judges?", Canadian judicial Council (6 July 2010),
online: <http://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca> [Felsky, "Skype"].
" Martin Felsky, "Facebook and Social Networking Security", Canadian judicial Council
(November 2009), online: <http://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca> [Felsky, "Facebook"].
' Felsky, "Skype" supra note 12 at 1, n 1.
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acceptable use. This is in stark contrast to the response of other
jurisdictions where court policies on social-media use are
now commonplace.
A. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF SOCIAL MEDIA
Social media is defined as "mobile and web-based technologies [which]
create highly interactive platforms via which individuals and communities
share, co-create, discuss, and modify user-generated content."' There are
different types of social media: collaborative projects (e.g., Wikipedia),
blogs (e.g., TheCourt.ca), content communities (e.g., YouTube),
social-networking websites (e.g., Facebook), virtual game worlds (e.g.,
World of Warcraft), and virtual social worlds (e.g., Second Life).16 This
paper focuses on social-networking websites, though each type of social
media may have particular and important impacts on the judicial process.
Social media may also be understood as a branch of the broader world of
"digital media and courts" which may include the blogs, Facebook pages,
and Twitter feeds by which information on a major trial might be
disseminated. "Digital media and courts" would also extend to
subscription RSS feeds, websites that aggregate information on particular
topics, and other online platforms for circulating reports and commentary
on a court's docket and activities.
Social networking differs from traditional media in its ability to
connect users at any time, any place. It allows for a continuous stream of
communication. Consider newspapers: Until recently, a writer would
research and publish an article the day after the event occurred. Those
who read the article were those who purchased and, more likely,
subscribed to the particular paper that carried that article. If readers had
any interest in commenting, they would need to send in their comments
to the publication carrying that particular article, understanding that the
* Jan H Kietzmann er al, "Social Media? Get Serious! Understanding the Functional
Building Blocks of Social Media" (2011) 54:3 Business Horizons 241 at 241.
16 See generally Andreas M Kaplan & Michael Haenlein, "Users of the World, Unite!
The Challenges and Opportunities of Social Media" (2010) 53:1 Business Horizons
59 at 60.
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physical space in the paper limited the publisher's capacity to publish
comments. The article existed in one period of time; to find that article
required going to the archives. Even when posted online under a "paywall"
or newspaper website, the way in which information is conveyed is static.
Social media, on the other hand, allows for multiple and non-linear
discourses. An article is published online. Readers may view it because
someone posted a link to the article on their Twitter or Facebook page,
recommending the article for friends and followers, while others may
explore the author, her previous publications, favourite restaurants, and
political-campaign donation history. The article itself may have
embedded links to other sources or commentary. If readers like the article,
they too may re-tweet or share it on their respective pages so that their
friends and followers may be directed to it. If they wish to comment, they
may do so at the click of a button beneath the article posting their
comments in real time (or sometimes with a slight delay because of a
website moderator). Individuals from all over the world can access and
comment on the article.
Connectivity is also a unique feature in social media. Readers can
access these pages and conversations through their cellphones, laptops,
and tablets at all times of the day. Social media, effectively, is a platform
for selective listening in a very large conversation. You can see the many
conversations your friends or colleagues are engaged in and can choose
whether to join actively or simply observe passively. On Twitter or
LinkedIn, for example, users constantly update their status. Thousands of
conversations take place at the same time, and a user can scroll down their
page to see which, if any, conversations they wish to join, or organize a live
feed on particular topics, people, or events they wish to see.
Unlike social clubs or civic groups that one must join and maintain
membership in, being a part of a social-media network does not imply any
particular commonality or shared values. For example, if a judge joins a
civil-liberties association, that may be taken to imply sympathy with the
association's goals and activities. If a judge instead follows that
organization on Twitter, or receives a feed from its Facebook page,
however, it is unclear whether and in what circumstances this might be
taken to imply support or "membership". Such connections do constitute
a digital profile-what we term a judge's "digital baggage"-and may well
634 VOL 46:3
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constitute a new and uncharted aspect for the regulation of ethical
conduct.
B. DIGITALBAGGAGE
A judge's "digital baggage" often is accumulated prior to appointment,
and over time, the scope and significance of this baggage will doubtlessly
grow. For example, we have yet to confront the spectre of a judicial
candidate for appointment having to account for Facebook postings two
decades earlier as a law student.
One of the most significant ethical issues for judges occurs prior to
appointment---that is, what to disclose on their application form to be
considered for the judiciary. According to the Commissioner of Federal
Judicial Affairs, when lawyers seek judicial appointments, candidates must
be "prepared to make full disclosure of any matter that would reflect upon
their ability to perform the functions of judicial office, or upon the
credibility and repute of the judiciary as a whole."" The purpose of
disclosure is to maintain the high reputation of the judiciary. If there is
anything in a judge's history that may tarnish the reputation of the
judiciary-either by indicating a potential bias or a prior transgression
that may diminish the public's respect for the judiciary, it must be
disclosed. While it is something of a rarity today for a judicial candidate to
have a significant digital profile, this soon will be commonplace. For
instance, most law students and young lawyers have active online accounts
on Linkedln, Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram, in addition to the blogs
they have commented on, articles they have published, photographs they
have been tagged in, etc.
Members of the public can perform a search of a judge on any search
engine, any blog, article, journal, petition, or tweet that the candidate,
prior to his or her appointment, penned at any point in his or her career.
Information on group memberships and charitable donations are available
at the click of a button. Such searches may impact the public perception of
impartiality. Photos taken of sitting judges may also be seen by the public.
1 Office of the Commissioner for Federal judicial Affairs Canada, Considerations Which
Apply to an Applicationfor Appointment, online: <http://www.f)a-cmf.gc.ca>.
2013 635
UBC LAW REVIEW
Moreover, photographs taken prior to appointment-whether to the
knowledge of the candidate or not-may be uploaded to the Internet after
being appointed.
In the ongoing case involving Madam Justice Lori Douglas, this
question has taken centre stage in the debate around judicial ethics. Nude
photographs of Douglas were taken and uploaded to the Internet by
Douglas's husband, Jack King. The photographs were allegedly used to
harass Alex Chapman, a former client of King." Should the photos be
understood in the private zone of a judge's life, or is it appropriate to view
it in the context of public confidence in the judiciary? A live issue in the
CJC inquiry into Justice Douglas is whether or not she disclosed the
existence of the photographs as part of her application to join
the judiciary."
Justice Martin Freedman of the Manitoba Court of Appeal chaired the
committee that screened Douglas during her appointment. He testified
during the inquiry that he and the Council were aware of the
photographs.20 The Douglas Inquiry raises broader questions about the
disclosure ofdigital baggage.Tf the standard iBs whether a particular matter
could reflect poorly on the judiciary or the administration of justice, it is
not clear why digital baggage or personal or intimate relationships which
have no bearing on the lawyer's professional competence or personal
qualities (e.g., integrity, honesty, compassion, etc.) should qualify. In a
sense, however, while the ethical issue for the CJC may focus on
disclosure, the conversation about this case has focused on whether judges
should be entitled to a "private life" in an era where privacy extends more
" Steve Lambert, "Manitoba judge steps aside amidst complaint about nude photos",
The Globe and Mad (1 September 2010), online:
<http://www.heglobeandmail.com>.
" The inquiry is currently on hold as it deals with several issues including judicial review
and the status of various parties involved. See Cristin Schmitz, "The Douglas inquiry:
It gets curiouser and curiouser", The Lawyers Weekly 32:29 (30 November 2012),
online: <http://www.lawyersweekly.ca/index.php?section=article&articleid= 1791>.
20 "Man. judge disclosed nude photos, inquiry hears" The Canadian Press (27 July 2012),
online: CTV News <http://www.ctvnews.ca>.
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than ever into domains over which an individual has little or no control
over the flow of information.
The question now turns to whether a judge's digital baggage may
reasonably be said to influence judicial impartiality. The ethical standard
for judicial impartiality is not determined in relation to community
standards on morality, but rather mirrors the test for a reasonable
apprehension of bias under which a decision of the court may be
challenged. The CJC's Ethical Principles states that "[j]udges should
disqualify themselves in any case in which they believe that a reasonable,
fair minded and informed person would have a reasoned suspicion of
conflict between a judge's personal interest (or that of a judge's immediate
family or close friends or associates) and a judge's duty."2'
While appointees undoubtedly will come with more digital baggage in
the future, it is possible that such baggage will be seen to tarnish the
candidate's reputation (and, potentially, the judiciary's reputation) less.
What might have shocked the public a generation ago (an openly gay or
lesbian judge, judges with children out of wedlock, etc.) today barely
attracts notice. Similarly, the scenario of groups or individuals who are
parties to litigation and who come before the court with Facebook
connections to the judge may cause anxiety today but may well appear
quaint a generation from now. In other words, if the ability to adjudicate
free from bias is the standard, social media has the potential to reshape the
relevance of a judge's background to the perception of his or
her impartiality.
The point of departure for the reasonable-apprehension-of-bias
standard applicable to judges remains the R v RDS22 decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada. In that case, the Court divided on the
question of whether it constituted a reasonable apprehension of bias for
Justice Sparks, an African-Canadian judge, to indicate that in her
experience, police may overreact when dealing with non-white groups.
Justice Cory cast the deciding vote for the view that her comments did not
cross the line into the reasonable apprehension of bias, but he was clearly
21 Ethical Principles, supra note 6 at 29.
22 [1997] 3 SCR 484, 151 DLR (4th) 193 [RDS cited to SCR].
2013 637
UBC LAW REVIEW
troubled by her comments nonetheless. He held that, "[a]lthough her
remarks were inappropriate they did not give rise to a reasonable
apprehension of bias."" Judges legitimately may have these beliefs, he
concluded, but ought to be extremely cautious if expressing them. The
Court also established in RDS that the reasonable apprehension of bias
standard for judges in Canada is dynamic rather than static, and will be
assessed contextually.24
Moreover, subsequently, in Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada," the
Supreme Court considered the potential conflict of Supreme Court of
Canada Justice Ian Binnie, who had earlier served as an Associate Deputy
Minister for the Government at the time a land-claim case was being
litigated, which eventually was decided by Justice Binnie once he was on
the Court. In deciding that no reasonable apprehension of bias existed,
given the long passage of time between the justice's role in government
and the matter reaching the Supreme Court, the Court held that bias "is
an inquiry that remains highly fact-specific."26
The Court in these cases found that what occurred in a person's past,
either personal or professional, is a matter over which there will often be
only circumstantial evidence (for example, Ian Binnie's signature on an
earlier document) or associational evidence (for example, Justice Sparks's
race implying a greater awareness of systemic racism in the province where
she grew up). Social media may usher in an era where precise and detailed
personal and professional data will be readily available. Sifting through
this data to separate the relevant information for a standard of judicial
impartiality and propriety from information that is not relevant will grow
in importance as a matter of judicial ethics. In this sense as well, the
Douglas Inquiry is a harbinger of the judicial ethics controversies to come.
At the end of the day, the only observation about bias that is enduring
is that, as a standard of conduct, it is in constant flux. Phillip Bryden has
2 Ibid at 546.
24 Ibid at 509.
25 2003 SCC 45, [2003] 2 SCR 259.
26 Ibidat para77.
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argued that "the conceptual tools we use in addressing issues of judicial
impartiality tend to fail us precisely in the marginal cases where reasonable
people could disagree on whether or not a judge ought to be
disqualified."" In furtherance of this submission, Bryden and Jula Hughes
conducted a survey on the application of reasonable apprehension of
bias." Their study confirmed that there is indeed a large divergence
among respondents in their attitudes towards recusal in a number of
scenarios that fall in the margins.29 With respect to social media, the
centre remains elusive-all appears to fall in the margins. Over time,
however, this unfamiliarity with digital baggage will disappear. We think
it will be only in the most egregious cases that a judicial nominee's digital
baggage will be disqualifying (for example, where it contains evidence of
unlawful activity). There is no reason to think that the judicial oath will
be any less significant as a rite of passage with respect to a candidate's
digital baggage than with other roles they have taken on in the past (as
lawyers, speakers, writers, etc.). Still, widespread public access into the
private lives of judges (both in their pre- and post-appointment lives) has
never been greater, and is posed to grow. Judges, more than ever, will be
and be seen to be full members of the community.
C. INVOLVEMENT IN THE DIGITAL COMMUNITY
A digital presence becomes even more of an ethical issue once a judge is
appointed. In the inquiry involving Justice Matlow's involvement in a
neighbourhood campaign to oppose the redevelopment of a site near his
house, the CJC confirmed that by agreeing to be appointed to the bench,
judges' freedom of expression is diminished.30 In that case, the ethical
27 Philip Bryden, "Legal Principles Governing the Disqualification of Judges" (2003)
82:3 Can Bar Rev 555 at 557.
28 Philip Bryden & Jula Hughes, "The Tip of the Iceberg: A Survey of the Philosophy
and Practice of Canadian Provincial and Territorial Judges Concerning Judicial
Disqualification" (2011) 48:3 Alta L Rev 569.
29 Ibid at 609.
30 Report of the Canadian Judicial Council to the Minister ofJustice (3 December 2008) at
para 82, online: Canadian Judicial Council <http://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca>.
2013 639
UBC LAW REVIEW
obligation of judges to "conduct themselves in a way that will sustain and
contribute to public respect and confidence in their integrity, impartiality
and good judgment" was found to be consistent with Justice Matlow's
involvement in the neighbourhood association and in his taking steps to
oppose the redevelopment of the site near his house (though the CJC
took issue with his signing correspondence opposing the redevelopment
as "Justice Ted Matlow").3' In other words, the CJC demarcated a
distinction between a judge's activities as a private citizen and a judge's
activities as a judicial officer. Further, the CJC concluded that Justice
Matlow's actions in promoting media coverage of the neighbourhood-
development issue also were not incompatible with the Ethical Guidelines
(so long as the judge does not use his or her position to attract the
media attention).
While judges are free to comment as private citizens about social,
economic, and political issues, there are important limits on such
comments, including the use of inappropriate and intemperate language
and any suggestion that the judge is providing legal advice through such
comments. These limits, moreover, while fixed in principle, continue to
evolve in their application. In the context ofJustice Matlow's activities, for
example, while the majority of the CJC panel expressed reservations
about some of the impugned conduct, they stopped short of
recommending removal.
In light of the CJC's recommendation concerning Justice Matlow, it is
clear that judges who use social media to express their engagement in the
community and to further their involvement in community affairs are not
in violation of any ethical guideline per se. The CJC's recommendation
also suggests that it may be relevant whether a judge uses his or her name
for social-media posts rather than his or her judicial office. Beyond the
form of connectivity, the focus of judicial ethics will remain on what is
said and on the context in which it is said (that is, the distinction between
a judge communicating as a private citizen and a judge seeking to use the
influence of his or her office or imply that he or she is speaking in
that capacity).
31 Ibid at paras 107-08.
640 VOL 46:3
JUDICIAL ETHICS IN A DIGITAL AGE
While the distinction between a judge communicating as a judge and
communicating as a private citizen may be challenging in any context, we
suggest it is particularly difficult if not impossible to sustain in the context
of social media. A personal email is not public, but may of course be
forwarded or replied to while copying others, which will quickly make it
so. A blog post may have 5 views or 5000. A post to Judicom (the
Canadian judiciary's internal email and intranet portal, discussed below)
may be a public communication but is intended only for other judges-
does this make such a communication public or private? A post to a
Facebook wall with privacy settings in place is a particularly apposite grey
zone. It is intended to be shared but to a limited number of people,
although that number may in the thousands. The Ethical Guidelines in
their current form, beyond the general obligation to act in a way that will
lead to public confidence, provide little insight as to the distinction
between public and private communications and the implications of each.
With respect to judges' online profiles, the Ethical Guidelines further
provide scant guidance as to what judges should and should not do in
these contexts. Perhaps because of this uncertainty, or simply due to the
generational gap and personal preference, in Canada, few judges have
searchable Facebook accounts,3 2 and the ones that do have limited profiles
(like Ontario Court of Appeal Justice Russell Juriansz) such that only his
friends can see his profile.
Federally appointed Justice Jeffrey Oliphant33 has a Twitter account,
(with the handle @joliphant),3 and follows a mix of journalists,
politicians, and the Governor General. Would it ever be problematic for a
judge to follow politicians from one party but not the others? Should it be
32 On Facebook, users have the ability to change their security settings so that they
cannot be found by searching. They can only search for, and therefore add, "friends"
by seeking them.
31Justice Oliphant was appointed in 1985, and so all social-networking accounts were
done after his being appointed. See his Twitter account here: Jeffrey Oliphant, online:
Twitter <https://twitter.com/joliphant>.
3 Although he only has three tweets and none of them were political in nature, one does
reference the Mulroney/Schreiber Inquiry over which he presided.
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a matter of public concern as to who follows a judge (or, put differently,
who a judge allows to follow him or her)?
There is a public Facebook page associated with Chief Justice
McLachlin. At the time of writing, 107 people "like" this page." Even
though this is not a personal page, at what point does that distinction blur
in the public mind? Is it appropriate for a lawyer or a party appearing
before a judge to "like" or share the page with his or her friends? In that
sense, is the party promoting or complimenting the judge's page? Does it
make a difference if the judge is not at all involved in the making of the
page, or is it sufficient that a reasonable apprehension of bias will
be raised?
In the United States, in 2010, 40% of judges engaged in social
networking," although this number today is undoubtedly higher. The
United States has already had to confront far more ethical scenarios
involving social media, including whether judges ought to delete friends
who may appear in front of them in hearings, untag pictures of themselves,
leave groups that they are members of, and unfollow political figures.
Because this stanclard' depens on a judge's understanding of how a
reasonable person would perceive his or her actions, it is necessarily both
subjective and subject to evolution over time. For example, there was a
time when judges were expected not to appear or speak in public. Justice
Sopinka, when describing the monastic nature of the judiciary noted in
1989, and then again in 1996, that
[s]ome had withdrawn completely from society. They would not be seen
in a public place such as a bar, would not speak in public and even
refrained from socializing with counsel. Often these same judges would
complain about the difficulty of adjusting to this monastic lifestyle. At
the same time, other judges behaved more or less like ordinary citizens. In
* See Beverley McLachlin, online: Facebook <https://www.facebook.com/
pages/Beverley-McLachlin/108104015877672?rf=110948695596620>.
3 See Karen Eltis, Courts, Litigants and the Digital Age: Law, Ethics and Practice
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012) at 91, citing "New Media and the Courts: The Current
Status and a Look at the Future: A Report of the New Media Committee of the
Conference of Court Public Information Officers", Conference of Court Public
Information Officers (26 August 2010), online: <http://www.ccpio.org>.
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particular, they accepted some public speaking engagements and even
appeared to be interviewed on television. . . . The old school adhered to
the maxim that a judge should speak only in reasons for judgment. The
more modem school admitted of no such restriction. 7
Judges are less monastic than ever. Judges now routinely teach, write,
give speeches, and lend their name to worthy causes (particularly in
relation to access-to-justice-oriented activities). In these activities, judges
in Canada are provided the benefit of the doubt in most instances. There
is a "presumption of judicial integrity" and judges are "assumed to be
[persons] of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a
particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances."'
A concern touched upon in the Douglas Inquiry is that while you can
control what you post, you cannot control the conduct of others, and
what they post online about you. For instance, a judge at a party may
make a remark that can become permanent. Even if not in a speech and
simply made during cocktail conversation, the person at the party may go
home, write about it, and post it online. This person can do so moments
after the conversation and can even post from the party. The judge is then
confronted with having to confirm, deny, or ignore the post, each of
which could give rise to significant ethical implications.
Still, the primary concern with respect to social media and judicial
conduct is what judges themselves post. In 2007, for example, a part-time
judge in North Las Vegas lost his position for making hostile comments
on his MySpace page. Under personal interests, Jonathan MacArthur, a
34-year-old criminal-defense lawyer, listed "Breaking my foot off in a
prosecutor's ass . . . and improving my ability to break my foot off in a
prosecutor's ass." 9 A District Attorney found the page and went to the
North Las Vegas Justice Court administrator requesting MacArthur's
recusal on all criminal cases as he was perceived to have a bias against
37 John Sopinka, "Must ajudge be a Monk-Revisited" (1996) 45 UNBLJ 167 at 167.
38 Eltis, supra note 36 at 84 citing RDS, supra note 22 at paras 28, 32, and United States v
Morgan, 313 US 409 at 421 (1941).
1 "MySpace judgment: Guilty", Las Vegas Review-Journal (13 August 2007), online:
<http://www.reviewjournal.com>.
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prosecutors. Despite defending the interests as a joke, and that the Nevada
Code ofJudicial Conduct applies to "substitute jurists" only when they are
sitting on the bench, the perceived bias that may interfere with his ability
to rule fairly from the bench was sufficient for the Justice of the Peace for
whom MacArthur was substituting to cease using MacArthur's services.4
Increasingly, the issue for judicial ethics will not simply be what was or
was not posted, but what reasonable efforts a judge has undertaken to
limit communications intended to be private from becoming public. For
instance, several social-networking sites have the capability to limit the
ability of others to publically comment on one's page. For example, it is
possible to disable one's Facebook wall," and change security settings to
limit who can see tagged pictures. However, such action renders Facebook
a private-messaging forum, minimizing the utility of the website. A judge's
contact information is often public (e.g., work address or office phone
number). Thus, judges who have Facebook or other social-media accounts
likely will be expected to take proactive steps to ensure a greater degree of
privacy and security than others.
Similarly, Karen Eltis suggests that since the purpose of online forums
such as blogs and Twitter is to express opinions, judges eschew such
networks. 2 This approach is as difficult to imagine as being sustainable as
encouraging judges to avoid email in the 1990s would have been. Others
have recommended judges limit their social-media activities on Facebook
and use internal networks such as Judicom,c3 a secure and private
messaging community designed to "facilitate and enhance
communication, collaboration and knowledge sharing by connecting all
members within a trusted online environment."" 800 federal judges and
950 members of the Canadian judicial community use Judicom.5
40 Ibid.
41 The Facebook wall is a forum for "friends" to publically post.
42 Eltis, supra note 36 at 96.
4 Felsky, "Facebook", supra note 13 at 10.
4 See Judicom Portal, online: <http://www.judicom.ca/home-eng.html>.
45 Ibid.
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Beyond the challenges posed by how judges choose to engage with
social media, there is an additional danger that judges will have their
personal information posted without their knowledge or consent."46 If
personal information is posted, judges run the risk of someone creating a
fake profile and fraudulently posting on the judge's behalf. In a facetious
example, Lord Denning has a twitter handle, @LordDenndeezie. 7 Even if
creating a false online account is contrary to the user agreements of the
social-networking website,48 once an account is made, the damage may
already be done. Comments may be misattributed to the judge, and once
they are publicly available, they may tarnish the judge's reputation in the
community, or it may be increasingly difficult for members of the public
to distinguish between posts that purport to be from a judge and those
that actually are from a judge.
Here again, the issue is not so much the fact of a judge's personal
information being made available through social media, but what
obligations on the judge arise as a result. Judges have a duty to disclose any
information that may tarnish the integrity of the judiciary, so Eltis
suggests that judges perform frequent search-engine checks, ensuring that
nothing turns up involving their information or activities that could
tarnish the perception of the judiciary.49 Leaving aside whether this is a
reasonable obligation to impose on judges, it is unclear what a judge could
be expected to do in the face of such a situation other than to disclose it
to others.
1. THE ALTERNATIVE: EMBRACING A CYBER-JUDICIARY
Much of the discussion thus far has focused on the assumption that social
media is a threat and that the purpose of judicial ethics is to limit and
4 See Eltis, supra note 36 at 75.
4 See Lord DenningMR, online: Twitter <https://twitter.com/LordDenndeezie>.
4 See Facebook, Facebook's Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, online:
<https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms>. "4(1) Registration and Account Security"
states, "You will not provide any false personal information on Facebook, or create an
account for anyone other than yourself without permission."
4 Eltis, supra note 36 at 98.
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regulate a judge's interaction with social media. Social media is also an
incredibly effective communicative tool, and for some, a virtual way of
life. Some judges, of course, have embraced social media, and their
activities raise the question of whether there is such a thing as a judge who
is too connected to the community.
Justice Harvey Brownstone of the Ontario Court of Justice, for
example, is trying to change the judicial culture, harnessing the Internet
and social media to improve public awareness of family-law issues, and as a
consequence, access to justice. Arguably, Justice Brownstone has deployed
social media more broadly and more deeply than any other judge in
Canada in order to advance his cause. Justice Brownstone launched his
career in the public eye when he first published Tug of War: A Judge's
Verdict on Separation, Custody Battles, and the Bitter Realities of Family
Court."o The book cautions readers about entering family court and
explains the negative effect such litigation has on children and families.
Despite any anxieties Judge Brownstone may have felt after publishing
his book, he received letters praising his book from the Chief Justice of
the Ontario Court of Justice, Annemarie Bonkalo and Ontario Superior
Court Judge Heather Smith. Both justices supported the book and
insisted that it be distributed widely. Though one anonymous judge
explained that the only reason Brownstone was able to avoid criticism was
because he turned all profits from book sales to children's charities, the
response has been overwhelmingly positive." The blogosphere's response
to the publishing of the book has been for the most part positive, with one
blogger urging individuals considering going to family court to read it
first." One practicing lawyer refers to the book as an easily understandable
SO (Toronto: ECW, 2009).
51 See Kirk Makin, "Insider look at family court lauded; Judge wins unexpected praise
from colleagues for book on perils of divorce litigation" The Globe and Mail (28
February 2009) A8.
52 See e.g. Nicole Garton-Jones, "New Book: Tug of War by Harvey Brownstone",
Heritage Law Blog (9 June 2009), online: <http://www.bcheritagelaw.com>.
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resource on how family court works, which provides case examples and
proffers alternatives to litigation.53
Justice Brownstone also hosts the TV show Family Matters.5 4 The
program educates viewers on legal issues within the family-law sector. In
addition, Justice Brownstone has a Facebook page linked to the show (the
page is associated to the show and not the judge personally)."5
Before each episode of Family Matters, a disclaimer appears stating that
Justice Brownstone does not endorse the opinions of those on the show
and further stipulates that the judge is not providing legal advice. This is a
very fine line that Justice Brownstone acknowledges: "I am walking a
tightrope because I am now in an entertainment medium. Still, I think the
world is ready for a different kind of TV judge. A real judge. I think the
world is ready."" The show itself generates revenues. There are
advertisements before the program begins, although Justice Brownstone is
not keeping any of the money himself. The website explains that the
proceeds go to charity." From the standpoint of judicial conduct,
however, if either the show or website generates income, or has links to
paid advertisers, does it matter that the proceeds go to non-profit or for-
profit ventures?
Justice Brownstone's online persona has raised many eyebrows in the
legal community." That said, there is no indication that Justice
See Michael Rappaport, "Tug of War: A judge testifies on family law", Michael
Rappaport Barrister & Solicitor, online: Mr Legal <http://www.mrlegal.ca>.
5 See Family Matters with Justice Harvey Brownstone, online: Family Matters
<http://www.familymatterstv.com/about>.
5 See Family Matters with Justice Harvey Brownstone, online: Facebook
<https://www.facebook.com/FamilyMattersTV>.
56 "Ontario judge hits airwaves to sate appetite for legal info", Vancouver Sun (14
September 2011), online: Canada.com <http://www.canada.com>.
Supra note 54.
58 Professor Adam Dodek posted the following comments to the Canadian LegalEthics
listserv on 18 April 2012:
This is only what I can describe as strange on several levels: Justice Harvey Brownstone
of the Ontario Court of Justice wrote a (great) book called 'Tug of War: A Judge's
Verdict on Separation, Custody Battles, and the Bitter Realities of Family Court' All
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Brownstone's presence on either television or social media has
compromised his integrity or independence. Indeed, the fact that Justice
Brownstone has not been subject to any sanction suggests others may be
emboldened to pursue a similar path.
D. JUDICIAL ETHICS IN DIFFERENT JURISDICTIONS
Should judicial ethics be focused on regulating and limiting a judge's
engagement in social media, or facilitating such engagement? Because the
sphere of judicial ethics involving a judge's digital activities in Canada
remains embryonic, it is helpful to consider how peer jurisdictions have
addressed this phenomenon. Below, we canvass the development of rules,
guidelines, and practices relating to judicial online conduct with a view to
the relevance of such approaches in the Canadian context.
Personal use of social media in the Canadian judiciary cannot be easily
equated to the American judiciary. This is because in many state
jurisdictions, judges are elected or subject to retention votes. Such judges
may legitimately use social-media connectivity in order to raise campaign
funds, seek endorsements, and advertise in ways that would all constitute
unethical conduct in any Canadian jurisdiction. More to the point for our
purposes, friends and followers serve different purposes, and so the
considerations regarding impartiality are not the same.
As for policies regulating the US judiciary, prior to the American Bar
Association (ABA) coming out with a formal opinion in February 2013
on "Judge's Use of Electronic Social Networking Media"," the relevant
policy considerations were at the state level. Before this opinion was
rendered, there was a patchwork of conflicting ethical guidelines. While
royalties are donated to charity. He did interviews about his book. He now has a TV
show called Family Matters. That show has a Twitter account which promotes the TV
show. It only sends messages and does not follow anyone else on Twitter-see
@FamilyMatters.https://twitter.com/#!/FamilyMattersI am one of his 881 followers.
Saw this tweet today which I thought was strange...The link is to an external lawyer
advice / advertising site. Just seems a bit strange...
5 American Bar Association, "Judge's Use of Electronic Social Networking Media" (21
February 2013), online: <http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/professional responsibility/formal opinion_462.authcheckdam.pdf>.
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the ABA does not exercise authority over judicial conduct, it is hoped that
this opinion will create clarity in acceptable judicial conduct.
The ABA's opinion recognizes that interactions made on electronic
social media (ESM) are not static. Comments, images, and personal
information can be widely disseminated quickly and easily. Such
dissemination can compromise the "independence, integrity, and
impartiality of the judge, as well as . . . undermine public confidence in
the judiciary."60
The ABA recommends that a judge who engages in ESM should do so
while considering the relevant provisions in their Model Code of Judicial
Conduct (which is analogous to the CJC Ethical Principals). They too
must consider the requirement to act in a manner that promotes
confidence in the judiciary. Judges must be cognizant that ESM
communication may be deemed to be exparte communication, and must
behave in a way that does not elevate such communication to that level.6 1
Interestingly, the ABA recognizes that ESM connections may be so
casual so as not to require disclosure. If, however, the connection contains
current and frequent communication, there is a larger impetus for
disclosing such a relationship.6 ' Unlike the Canadian reasonable-
apprehension-of-bias standard, the standard in the United States is
whether the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or
lawyer.63 The same analysis must be conducted when such an ESM
connection exists as when the judge has a professional or personal
connection with a party before the judge in court. The ABA does not
require a judge to do a search of all of his or her ESM connections if a
judge does not have specific knowledge that such an ESM connection
exists and would rise to the level of an actual or perceived problematic
relationship." The opinion also provides guidance to judges with respect
6 Ibid at 1-2.
61 Ibid at 2.
62 Ibid at 3.
63 Ibid at 3, referencing Rule 2.11 of the Model Code.
' Ibid at 3.
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to judicial campaigns and elections, which has less relevance in a
Canadian context.
As indicated above, the ABA opinion seeks to offer a coherent
approach to judicial conduct in the context of social media in contrast to
the existing patchwork quilt of federal and state approaches. Until and
unless jurisdictions adopt the ABA standards, those existing measures will
remain in force.
While it is beyond the scope of this study to detail all varied
approaches in US jurisdictions, a few examples will illustrate how the field
has developed to date. Many jurisdictions have remained silent on the
matter. Other jurisdictions have attempted to subsume social media under
existing rules. The California Judges' Association Committee on Judicial
Ethics, for instance, has stated that social networking is analyzed under
the "same rules that govern a judge's ability to socialize and communicate
in person, on paper and over the telephone.""
At a judicial conference in the United States in April 2010, a Code of
Conduct Committee designed a resource packet to help courts and judges
consider whether and how to develop policies and guidelines for the use
of social media by judicial employees. The council provided sample
provisions that could be used in various jurisdictions.66 Perhaps the CJC
may wish to come out with similar guidelines so to provide more clarity.
While the interaction between social media and judicial ethics remains
relatively novel, there is already a significant body of judicial discipline
cases in the United States exploring some of the questions raised above.
For example, a magistrate judge in South Carolina was Facebook
friends with several law-enforcement officers and employees of the
Magistrate's office. The Magistrate was concerned about the possibility of
6 Eltis, supra note 36 at 93, citing California Judges Association Judicial Ethics
Committee, "Online Social Networking" (23 November 2010)
at 3, online: <www.caljudges.org/files/pdf/Opinion66FinalShort.pdf> [California
Judges Association].
66 Committee on Codes of ConductJudicial Conference of the United States, "Resource
Packet for Developing Guidelines on Use of Social Media by Judicial Employees"
Judicial Conference Committee on Codes of Conduct (April 2010), online: <http://
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/conduct/SocialMediaLayout.pdf>.
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an appearance of impropriety, and so the Magistrate proactively inquired
into the propriety of being a member of Facebook. In October 2009, an
Advisory Committee on Standards of Judicial Conduct concluded that
"[a] judge may be a member of Facebook and be friends with law
enforcement officers and employees of the Magistrates as long as they do
not discuss anything related to the judge's position as magistrate."'6
North of the state border in North Carolina, Judge Terry presided over
a child-custody and child-support hearing in the fall of 2008.68 On 9
September 2008, while in the judge's chambers, Judge Terry and Charles
Schieck, the defendant's attorney, were discussing Facebook. Though the
plaintiff's attorney, Jessie Conley, was present during the conversation, she
stated her ignorance and absence from the social network.69 Shortly after,
Schieck posted on Facebook with respect to whether his client had an
affair, asking "how do I prove a negative". Judge Terry responded by
posting that he had "two good parents to choose from". Judge Terry
indicated in another post that the case was not settled. Schieck also
posted, "I have a wise Judge." 0 Judge Terry told Conley about the
Facebook exchanges between himself and Schieck.7 ' There were
subsequent back and forth Facebook posts between Terry and Schieck on
the determination of the final days of trial.7 1
Judge Terry also performed Google searches on Schieck's client. The
judge's decision was impacted by the information he found during these
1 Advisory Committee on Standards of Judicial Conduct, "Opinion No. 17-2009: Re:
Propriety of a magistrate judge being a member of a social networking site such as
Facebook", South Carolina Judicial Department (October 2009), online:
<http://www.judicial.state.sc.us>.
68 State of North Carolina Judicial Standards Commission, "Inquiry No. 08-234: Public
Reprimand: B. Carlton Terry, JR, District Court Judge, Judicial District 22" (1 April
2009) at paras 1-2, online: <http://www.aoc.state.nc.us/www/public/coa/jsc/public
reprimands/jsc08-234.pdf>.
9 Ibid at paras 2-3.
70 Ibid arpara 5.
7 Ibidat para6.
72 Ibid at para7.
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independent searches. Judge Terry did not disclose to either party that he
was conducting this independent research. He disclosed his behavior after
orally entering his order.73 Conley filed an order requesting Judge Terry's
order be vacated, a new trial, and that Judge Terry be disqualified.71 The
judge disqualified himself and agreed that he would not repeat such
conduct in the future as he recognized that such action threatens public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. He also
agreed to read the North Code of Judicial Conduct which he disregarded
by engaging in ex parte communications with counsel in a matter being
tried before him, and he was influenced by information he independently
gathered by viewing a party's website, despite the contents of the website
not being entered into evidence.71
Recognizing the growing popularity of social-networking sites, a
California ethics opinion explained that the same rules that govern a
judge's ability to socialize in person are the same as those that apply on
paper, over the telephone, and on the Internet.1 Jurists may participate in
social media, but must be cautious about what they post, who can see
what they post, and what types of connections they make. In this way,
judges can be friends with lawyers who may appear before them; however,
it is not permissible to interact with attorneys who have matters before the
judge. Once a member of the judge's online social-networking community
has such a case pending, the judge must cease online interaction and
unfriend counsel. It is irrelevant what type of online relationship they
have; the appearance of such a relationship is detrimental.77
In Georgia, Chief Justice Ernest Woods of the Mountain Judicial
Circuit Superior Court resigned from the bench after questions regarding
a Facebook relationship with a defendant, Tara Elizabeth Black, were
" Ibid at paras 8-13.
7 Ibid at para 14.
" Ibid at 4.
76 California Judges Association Judicial Ethics Committee, "Opinion 66: Online Social
Networking" (23 November 2010) at 3, online: <http://www.caljudges.org
/files/pdf/Opinion%2066FinalShort.pdf>.
n Ibidat 10-11.
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publicized. The judge explained the reason for his resignation by saying, "I
just got tired of living under a microscope."8 District Attorney Rickman
learned of the emails after the parents of Black's friends brought them to
his attention. Facebook emails between Woods and Black were turned
over to the circuit's district attorney and then written about in
local newspapers. 9
The emails disclosed that Woods initiated the relationship. He said
that he was looking for a new person to cut his hair and noticed she
worked at a hair salon. Black offered to refer him to a colleague. Over the
course of their relationship, the two met in person and exchanged emails.
Black asked to borrow money for rent and Woods provided Black with
strategies to tackle her charge of theft and a case regarding one of
Black's friends."o
In light of the cases sampled above, it should not be surprising that in
April 2010, the Committee on Codes of Conduct provided a resource
packet to court administrators to assist courts in the development of
social-media policies." The packet includes options that courts might use
in crafting their own policies or guidelines.
The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island
social-media policy/guidelines have the following broad guidelines:12
1. Think before you post.
2. Speak for yourself, not your institution.
3. Keep secrets secret.
4. Remember the Guide (the Judiciary's Guide to Policies and
Procedures) (i.e., restrictions on partisan political activity).
7 Debra Cassens Weiss, "Ga. Judge Resigns After Questions Raised About Facebook
Contacts", ABAJournal (7 January 2010), online: <http://www.abajournal.com>.
7 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
I Committee on Codes of Conduct, Judicial Conference of the United States,
"Resource Packet for Developing Guidelines on Use of Social Media
by Judicial Employees" (April2010), online:<http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/conduct/SocialMediaLayout.pdf>.
2 Ibid at 28-30.
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5. Observe security protocol-(i.e., do not post pictures of
the courthouse).
While the ABA opinion will now no doubt play a significant role in
the development of judicial ethics in the social-media context in the
United States, many of the "grey areas" will continue to be developed
through fact-specific and incremental judgments. The United States is not
the only jurisdiction to address the implication of social media for judicial
ethics. In each jurisdiction, particular incidents or media-driven
controversy is driving the policy development in this field.
Just as the issue of digital baggage has arisen as a key topic in Canada
in the wake of the Douglas incident, so too in the United Kingdom has
the social-media debate focused on the blogosphere. A leaked memo
issued by Senior Presiding Judge Lord Justice Goldring warned judicial
office holders of the use of blogging.3 Although the memo does not
prohibit the use of blogging, it places stringent limitations on what can be
posted and how it can be posted." For instance, the memo states,
"{jludicial office holders should be acutely aware of the need to conduct
themselves, both in and out of court, in such a way as to maintain public
confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary."" The memo goes on to
warn judges against identifying themselves as members of the judiciary,
and against expressing opinions that if known could have damaging effects
on public confidence."6 Those in favour of judicial blogging stress the
educational aspect and insist that it can bring the public in better touch
with the law. So long as the judge does not blog about topics that question
judicial neutrality on a case, and limit expression to professionalism or
court history for example, why should judges be so limited?"
83 Trevor Coultart, "Guidance from the Senior Presiding Judge", A Work in Progress (10
August 2012), online: <http://trevorcoultart.wordpress.com>.
84 Lucy Reed, "Judiciary silenced out of court", The Guardian (14 August 2012), online:
<http://www.guardian.co.uk>.
85 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
8 See "Social Media and the Judiciary", The IT Countrey Justice (18 August 2012),
online: <http://theitcountreyjustice.wordpress.com>.
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As the above discussion illustrates, social media is a global
phenomenon but may affect different courts in different systems in
different ways. Just as the ABA opinion discussed the use of social media
in judicial elections in a way that is not relevant for Canada, Canada's
developing approach to digital baggage prior to appointment may have
less relevance in a system of judicial election. That said, developments in
judicial ethics in one part of the world will shed light on possibilities and
dangers in another. The question as to whether social media will
overcome judicial isolation, or create new barriers for judges who wish to
maintain privacy, will be a central one for all judges irrespective of
jurisdictional boundaries.
III. SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE COURTROOM
The issue of judicial ethics and conduct in relation to social media is
bound up in a broader question engaging the relationship between social
media and the justice system. One aspect of this issue will be the evolution
of the sub judice principle which governs media coverage of pending and
actual litigation." Another aspect relates to how publication bans and
other restrictions on media will interact with social media and "citizen
journalists" who seek to communicate (often instantly) both facts and
opinions about what is transpiring in a courtroom. The issue of whether it
is appropriate for a judge to initiate a Twitter account to share ideas and
comments about life in court may be affected by that court's approach to
social media more generally-for example, whether Twitter feeds are
permitted, or whether the court as an institution is engaged in
social media.
In January 2012, in a landmark speech at Carleton University on the
courts and media, Chief Justice McLachlin identified the cultural shift in
communication. Specifically, she discussed how information is now
packaged, disseminated, and consumed." While she explained that
8 For further discussion of this issue, see L Sossin & V Crystal, "A Comment on 'No
Comment': The SubJudice Rule and the Accountability of Public Offcials in the 21st
Century" 36 Dal LJ [forthcoming in 2014].
* McLachlin,supra note 1.
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members of the judiciary can work with the media to ensure press
coverage is accurate, prompt, and appropriate, it is becoming increasingly
difficult to do so. She poignantly asked: "How can a medium such as
Twitter inform the public accurately or adequately in 140 characters or
less?""o Despite these concerns, the CJC has still not created guidelines to
assist courts and judges with appropriate policies.
While it is important that there is transparency in the courtroom,
there is also a conflicting issue of accuracy and adequacy, as the Chief
Justice noted. With details of a trial immediately accessible, there is more
transparency in the courtrooms. With transparency comes greater public
interest in and awareness of the judicial process. Access is also improved by
the capability of individuals across the country to follow court
proceedings without being limited by location. For example, during the
Michael Rafferty trial in the winter of 2012, many journalists, including
Melanie Nagy from CTV (Twitter handle: @MelanieNagyCTV), live-
tweeted the case."
Consistent with the Chief Justice's concerns, Connie Crosby has
observed that Twitter provides no space for clarifying context and giving
facts.92 Uncovering the facts of a case takes time. Quotes tweeted
immediately after they are said can be quite damaging. For instance, an
inflammatory tweet regarding the Tamil Tigers was mistakenly attributed
to Mayor David Miller. In actuality, the comment was made to and not by
the former Toronto mayor." In contrast, Michael Geist has said,
"[n]obody would question the right of the public to attend the trial....
Nobody would question a reporter taking notes at a meeting. Twitter is
nothing more than taking notes, with faster dissemination."'4 With
regards to accuracy, if mistakes are made in reporting, market forces will
9' Ibid.
9' See MelanieNagy, online: Twitter <https://twitter.com/MelanieNagyCTV>.
92 Luigi Benetton, "Twitter in the courtroom: a fad, or here to stay?" The Lawyers
Weekly (12 June 2009), online: <http://www.lawyersweekly.ca/index.php?section=
article&articleid=937>.
9 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
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drive followers to more reliable sources. When the US Supreme Court
handed down the "Obamacare" decision in June 2012, CNN mistakenly
tweeted the wrong outcome, causing a great deal of embarrassment and
reducing CNN's credibility in the matter."
In contrast, open engagement with these issues among Canadian
judges is less common. For example, Ontario Superior Court Justice
Douglas Rutherford made open comments in court regarding Twitter:
It seems to me that my concern with administration of justice, and any
communication directly out of the courtroom, is with the integrity of the
hearing, and the integrity of the [digital audio recording] equipment, and
not with the quality of the journalism. 6
Several Canadian jurisdictions are moving towards a greater emphasis
on the accessibility of the courts. Recognizing the importance of social
media and its impact on confidence in the judiciary, courtrooms in British
Columbia have switched the presumption to allow for social media in the
court, which increases transparency. The Supreme and Provincial Courts
have allowed the use of electronic communication devices in the public
galleries during trials; however, this allowance has been limited to lawyers
and accredited members of the media.9 The new rule tempers some of the
concerns of communicating sound bytes while fact finding. At the British
Columbia Court of Appeal, presumably where the Court is dealing
primarily with issues of law and not issues of fact, members of the public
are allowed to text." The BC lower court's limited allowance to
accredited journalists and lawyers is consistent with Connie Crosby's
concerns, as trained journalists are more likely to filter what they post, and
" See Jeff Mason, "Fox News, CNN left red-faced after announcing wrong verdict on
Obamacare" The National Post (28 June 2012), online:
<http://news.nationalpost.com>.
96 Cristin Schmitz, "Tweeting too trivial for some", The Lawyers Weekly (17 February
2012), online: <http://www.lawyersweekly.ca/index.php?section=article&
articleid= 1595>.
9 See "Tweeting allowed in B.C. courts, but it won't be a tweet-for-all", CTV News (2
August 2012), online: <http://www.cvnews.ca>.
98 See ibid.
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even fact check during breaks. Sensibly then, in the appellate courts where
tweeting is allowed by all members of the public (so long as there is no
publication ban), where courts are dealing with law and not findings of
fact, the risk of misattributing or mistaking a quotation is not as
damaging. Therefore, the need for access and transparency takes priority.99
Courts around the world have been grappling with social media in
similar contexts. Starting in December 2011, live-texting communications
such as Twitter have been allowed in courtrooms in the UK.'0
Representatives of the media and legal commentators are presumed to not
pose a danger of interference in the administration of justice. As such,
they may send live text-based communications from the court without
asking the court's permission. Regular citizens, however, still need to ask
permission either formally or informally. The Federal Court in Australia
decided in 2009 to grant judges the ability to decide on a case-by-case
basis whether they will permit Twitter coverage in their courtrooms.'
9 See Canadian Centre for Court Technology, "Canada-Wide Summary of Court
Policies on Live, Text-Based Communications from the Courtroom" (June 2013),
online: <http://ccct-cctj.ca / wp-content / files / intellaction / Policies-on-Live-Text-
Based-communications-June-2013.pdf>. This report surveys the various policies on
social media in select Canadian courtrooms, taken from the Canadian Centre for
Court Technology and Social Media Interaction Working Group. The Alberta Court
of Queen's Bench requires all devices to be turned off with an exemption for Counsel
and members of the media. The Supreme Court of Canada allows the usage of laptops
and handheld devices so long as sound is turned off; Wi-Fi is also available. Subject to
any exceptions, the New Brunswick Courts prohibit the transmission of texts. The
Nova Scotia Courts currently provide for an interim policy allowing tweeting in the
Court of Appeal unless directed otherwise. The Manitoba Courts allow members of
the public to text or use the web, though Manitoba is currently seeking ways to amend
the policies. See also Yamri Taddese, "New guidelines propose letting anyone tweet in
court", Law Times (5 November 2012), online: <http://www.lawrimes.com>.
" See Lord Judge: The Lord ChiefJustice of England and Wales, "Practice Guidance:
The Use of Live Text-Based Forms of Communication (Including Twitter) From
Court for the Purposes of Fair and Accurate Reporting" (14 December 2011), online:
Judiciary <http://www.judiciary.gov.uk>.
'' See Jennifer Van Grove, "Who Needs Cameras? Judges Allow Twitter in the
Courtroom", Mashable (19 October 2009), online: <http://mashable.com>.
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The ability of the public to disseminate information also poses new
concerns in the court -sometimes referred to as "crowdsourcing justice".
"Crowdsourcing" was coined by Jeff Howe in Wired Magazine.102 By
using the term "crowdsourcing" Howe sought to capture "the act of ...
taking a function once performed by employees and outsourcing it to an
undefined (and generally large) network of people in the form of an open
call."'o An example of crowdsourcing justice arose in the wake of the 2011
Vancouver riot, where the designated agents are journalists and the police;
the crowd is comprised of amateur photographers, videographers,
bloggers, and social-media participants.'" For related but distinct
purposes, journalists and the police encouraged all those who witnessed
the riot to post pictures and accounts, and identify those involved.
Further, as some participants were convicted, their identities and pictures
were posted as a further kind of punishment. As one report
dramatically observed:
In a chilling effect of this new crowdsourced justice, a conviction means
an automatic life sentence with no chance of parole. Many of those
involved in the [Vancouver] riots were inebriated and immature 20-
somethings. In a reckless moment following the final game of 2011
Stanley Cup playoffs, the reputations and lives of hundreds of young
Vancouverites were changed forever. As one blogger states, "Public
shaming thru the use of social media and blogging shall place them into a
world that is engraved into history. It shall be chiselled into the hard stone
of the internet and last eternally [sic]".
Today, your digital reputation defines you. For most employers, reference
checks today start with Google and Facebook. The thousands of photos
102 Jeff Howe, "The Rise of Crowdsourcing", Wired (June 2006), online:
<http://www.wired.com>.
103 Jeff Howe, "Crowdsourcing: A Definition", Crowdsourcing (2 June 2006), online:
<http://crowdsourcing.typepad.com>.
104 See David Finch, Sharon McIntyre & Kelly Sundberg, "The Vancouver Riot
Hangover: Crowdsourced Justice and Public Shaming", The Centennial Reader
(Summer 2012), online: <http://www.thecentennial.ca/shaming-and-
crowdsourcing>.
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and videos tagged with people's names will define their
digital reputations.'o
Thus, the concern regarding social media in the courtroom extends
beyond that of reporting facts and commentary but extends also to the
possibility of interfering with the administration of justice.
More challenging examples have emerged in the US context. For
example, after it was discovered that a juror tweeted about a trial, an
Arkansas firm tried to overturn a multi-million dollar judgment. Because
the juror published the comments after the verdict was delivered, the
judge did not grant a new trial."o6 In a 2011 Louisville case, a teenager who
was sexually assaulted said she discovered that her attackers pled guilty to
first-degree sexual abuse and misdemeanor voyeurism only moments
before it was announced in court.10 Contrary to the judge's order
forbidding everyone at the hearing from speaking about what happened in
the court or about the crime, the victim tweeted the names of her
attackers and explicitly stated her dismay with the order, tweeting,
"[pirotect rapist is more important than getting justice for the victim in
Louisville."" She now faces charges of contempt.'
Publication bans are easier to enforce when the court is dealing with
accredited media, as they have the resources to pay a sufficient fine that
would deter the publication from encouraging such illegal conduct. When
it is a citizen journalist or blogger, the traditional model of judicial control
over courtroom communications breaks down. Social media makes the
narrative of a judicial proceeding, in effect, beyond the effective control of
the presiding judge. By the same token, however, a judicial or court
os Ibid [footnotes omitted].
106 Benetton, supra note 92.
'7 "Savannah Dietrich, 17-Year-Old Sexual Assault Victim, Faces Charge for Naming
Attackers", Huffington Post (21 July 2012), online:
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com> [Huffington].
1os "'Thanks for Ruining My Life': A teen tweets against her attackers-and upends the
courts", Newsweek Magazine (10 December 2012), online: The Daily Beast
<http://www.thedailybeast.com>.
1o9 See Huffington, supra note 107.
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presence on social media may have the effect of countering fragmented,
partial, and sometimes misleading accounts with an "official" stream of
appropriate information. The judicial presence on social media could
similarly act within social media as a reliable, impartial, and authoritative
voice within a cacophony of views and perspectives. At a minimum,
judicial literacy in social media will allow judges themselves to better
understand, filter, and respond to information reaching them via
social media.
The judicial literacy in social media may similarly become of
increasing importance in carrying out judicial functions within the
courtroom. We have already alluded to the challenges of conventional
publication bans in the social-media context."o Social media also is
coming to play a more significant role in the commission of criminal and
regulatory offences. The Canadian Bar Association lists stalking, criminal
harassment, and cyberbullying as potential offences that can be
committed through social media."' Depending on the facts of the case,
stalking may be criminal harassment under section 264 of the Criminal
Code of Canada. Cyberbullying may be criminal harassment (section 264)
or defamation (section 300). Moreover, there has been a 780% rise in
social-media crimes in the last four years in the United Kingdom (there is
not yet comparable data in Canada, but with the rising popularity of
social-media websites, it is likely to have grown exponentially as well).112
For all of these reasons, attempting to sidestep the phenomenon of
social media is untenable for judges. Rather, we believe it is important to
develop a new generation of guidelines and practices that respond to the
"o See Andrew Bernstein & Rebecca Wise, "Conducting Litigation in the Social Media
Age", Torys (31 July 2012), online: <http://www.torys.com/Publications/
Publications/AR2012-23.pdf> (originally delivered at the Law Society of Upper
Canada's Special Lectures 2012: Employment Law and the New Workplace in the
Social Media Age program on 25-26 April 2012).
" "Stalking, Criminal Harassment and Cyberbullying", The Canadian Bar Association:
British Columbia Branch (January 2011), online: <http://www.cba.org>.
112 See "Social media-related crime reports up 780% in four years", The Guardian (27
December 2012), online: <http://www.guardian.co.uk>.
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disruptive potential of social media, rather than guidelines that attempt to
insulate judges from the rapidly changing world around them.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The Ethical Principles guide judges in their own personal conduct but
assume a static and defined context for judicial communications. The
nature of social media is dynamic and interconnected, where fictional
comments can take on real implications, and real comments can be shared
and manipulated in ways over which the initiator has no control. In short,
does a 20th century set of ethical principles need to be updated in order to
adapt to the realities of 21st century life?
A number of judges worry about the trend toward more precise rules.
Justice Sopinka captured this sentiment when he observed:
In the absence of any legal restriction, or indeed well-defined guidelines,
judges must determine for themselves what is appropriate. Surely judges
who daily make decisions affecting the lives of others can be trusted to
determine this matter for theImselves."
Judges and prospective judges do not require precise rules respecting
how to navigate the world of social media and developing technologies.
Rather, they need information, insight, and guidance about the nature
and implications of social media and developing technologies. Social
networking has changed the way in which information is disseminated.
Without clarity and consistency in the standards judges are expected to
abide by, the public's confidence in the judiciary and the justice system
may be jeopardized.
Developing guidelines ought never to be a "top-down" exercise in rule
making. As with the first iteration of the Ethical Principles, it will be
advisable to engage in a consultative process first, gathering data on
judicial use of social media and judicial views on social media. Such a
process may result in an iterative and educative set of reflections and
commentaries (housed, of course, online) that judges could consult, and
to which they could contribute as new situations arise.
"1 Sopinka, supra note 37 at 169.
662 VOL 46:3
JUDICIAL ETHICS IN A DIGITAL AGE
In our view, without presupposing the precise form or wording that a
guideline might take, it may be helpful to identify key content that would
address the gap we have highlighted.
A social-media guideline for Canadian judges should, we believe,
include the following:
* A definition of social media;
* A general principle that judges should be free to participate in
social-media platforms subject to a series of precautions:
o Judges who engage in social media have a
responsibility to understand the implications of
social media-for example, judges who wish to
maintain a Facebook page should consider available
privacy settings and take reasonable steps to protect
communications intended to be private;
o Judges have a special responsibility to be informed
about and responsive to their court's social-media
policies and practices;
o Judges should be accountable for their conduct on
social media, whether in the sense of the content
they write/post (the provisions of the existing Ethical
Principles dealing with political speech, etc., would
have equal application in this context) and in their
expressions of support (a "like" of a Facebook page, a
re-tweet of a Twitter post, etc.);
o Judges should be vigilant to avoid the specific variety
of conflicts to which social media can give rise-for
example, neither sending nor replying to any direct
social-media contacts from counsel who have or are
likely to have a matter before the judge, and
exercising caution in the "follows" and "likes" in
which they participate;
o Judges may choose to establish a "personal" or
"professional" presence on social media but they
should understand that, in the eyes of the public, all
of their activity will be measured against the standard
of public confidence in the justice system. All home
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pages for judges should indicate clear caveats as to
the nature and purpose of the judges' presence.
However, while a journalist or member of a company
may indicate that the views expressed in a blog or on
a Twitter feed are "my own" this distinction is not
applicable in the same way for judges. The scope for
judges to demarcate a social-media presence that is
personal is necessarily circumscribed by the nature of
the judicial role, the evolving expectations of the
public, and the overarching commitments all judges
must make to the administration of justice.
Ethical rules and guidelines work when there is a consensus on
whether certain kinds of conduct are appropriate or not. For the grey area,
such as the majority of social media at this stage, the better approach may
be to aim for principled engagement and dialogue to determine where the
consensus exists, and how to build towards it where it does not yet exist.
While the judiciary ought to have a significant voice in shaping this
process, the need for a process is apparent. Indifference and indecision in
the evolution of judicial ethics in the context of social media is the
mischief that needs to be addressed. A failure to consider the distinct
challenges of judicial ethics in the digital age will almost certainly make
further high-profile complaints and investigations more likely, and
ultimately lead to an erosion of public confidence in the judiciary and in
the administration of justice.
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